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MUNICIPAL PREFERENCE IN HYDROELECTRIC
RELICENSING: INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 7(a) OF THE
FEDERAL POWER ACT
INTRODUcTION
Investor-owned utility companies currently hold licenses to more
than 500 hydroelectric power projects' valued at an estimated twenty-
two billion dollars.2 Since 1920, many long-term licenses have been
issued to private utilities to develop water power facilities on the
nation's navigable waters.3 As these initial licenses have recently be-
gun to expire, 4 municipalities have sought to acquire new licenses,
claiming entitlement to a preference over incumbent private utilities.
This claim stems from section 7(a) of the Federal Power Act (FPA or
Act)- which mandates that "in issuing licenses to new licensees," 6
1. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Hydroelectric Power Resources of the
United States xxxiii (1980) (FERC-0070) [hereinafter cited as Hydro Resources]; see
Hershey, Power Plant Facing Challenge, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1983, at D20, col. 5
[hereinafter cited as Hershey I]; Moore, Lucrative Dam Licenses Offer Legal Bo-
nanza, Legal Times, Mar. 7, 1983, at 10, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Moore I]. As of
January 1, 1980, private utilities owned 523 hydropower-generating plants under
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) licenses. Hydro
Resources, supra, at xxxiii.
2. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit at 14 & n.22, Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 3573 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Petition]; see Moore I, supra note 1, at 10, col.
1. This estimate is based on the 1980 cost of replacing projects' aggregate developed
kilowatt capacity with conventional coal generation. Petition, supra, at 14 n.22.
3. See Federal Power Commission: Hearing on Legislative Oversight on Prob-
lems Involving the Federal Power Commission Before the Subcomm. on Communi-
cations and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969) (statement of Lee C. White, Chairman, FPC) [hereinafter
cited as 1969 Hearing]; 1980 FERC Ann. Rep. 38; Nowak, Cochran & Leitch, FERC
Revokes Preference in Hydro Relicensing, Legal Times, Nov. 28, 1983, at 10, col. 1.
4. H.R. Rep. No. 1643, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1969) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
Rep. No. 1643], reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3081, 3082. Initial
licenses were usually granted for a period of 50 years, and thus began to expire in the
1970's. See City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 346-47 (F.E.R.C.
1980), aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-
Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed,
No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 19, 1983); 1982 FERC Ann. Rep. 29; Thorpe, Private
Utilities Facing Challenge To Control of Hydroelectric Dams, Wall St. J., Aug. 1,
1983, at 17, col. 4; Hershey I, supra note 1, at D20, col. 5.
5. Ch. 687, § 7(a), 49 Stat. 838, 842 (1935) (originally enacted as Federal Water
Power Act of June 10, 1920 (FWPA), ch. 285, § 7, 41 Stat. 1063) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982)).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982).
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preference shall be given to applications of states7 and municipalities8
whose plans will serve the public interest at least as well as those of
private competitors. 9
At issue is the applicability of this tie-breaking preference 0 to reli-
censing proceedings" in which a state or municipality challenges an
7. The FPA defines a state as "a State admitted to the Union, the District of
Columbia, and any organized Territory of the United States." Id. § 796(6).
8. The FPA defines a municipality as "a city, county, irrigation district, drain-
age district, or other political subdivision or agency of a State competent under the
law thereof to carry on the business of developing, transmitting, utilizing, or distrib-
uting power." Id. § 796(7). The FERC has interpreted this definition to exclude
Indian bands, Escondido Mut. Water Co., 28 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 257, 297
n.105 (F.E.R.C. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 272 (1983), and electric membership cooperatives, Carolina
Power & Light Co., 14 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 554, 555-56 (F.P.C. 1976) (per
curiam).
9. 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982). Section 7(a) of the FPA provides:
In issuing preliminary permits hereunder or licenses where no preliminary
permit has been issued and in issuing licenses to new licensees under section
[15 hereof] the Commission shall give preference to applications therefor by
States and municipalities, provided the plans for the same are deemed by
the Commission equally well adapted, or shall within a reasonable time to
be fixed by the Commission be made equally well adapted, to conserve and
utilize in the public interest the water resources of the region ....
Id. This language is identical to that of the first paragraph of § 7 of the FWPA of
1920, 41 Stat. 1063, 1067, except for the deletion in 1935, 49 Stat. 838, 842, of the
words "navigation and" which preceded the words "water resources" at two places.
Compare 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982) with ch. 285, § 7, 41 Stat. 1063, 1067 (1920).
10. Municipal preference would be employed only if the Commission reaches the
threshold finding that the competitors' plans are "equally well adapted" to serve the
public interest. See Massella, Hydropower Relicensing: Merwin Dam, a Framework
for Decision, Pub. Util. Fort., Apr. 28, 1983, at 60; 1980 FERC Ann. Rep. 42. The
provisions of § 7(a) may facilitate the finding of a tie by allowing the municipality to
amend an inferior application so that its plan "shall within a reasonable time to be
fixed by the Commission be made equally well adapted." 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982).
The FERC has permitted verbatim duplication of competitors' proposals in the past.
See Tuolumne Regional Water District, 19 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,132, at 61,242
(1982). A municipality, therefore, could theoretically amend its application by copy-
ing the best elements of the original licensee's proposal and thereby submit an
"equally well adapted" plan. Thus, the resulting tie would be broken in favor of the
challenging municipality if § 7(a) was determined to be applicable in relicensings.
See Petition, supra note 2, at 18-19.
There have been only two relicensing decisions to date involving the municipal
preference question. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. In the first case,
City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344 (F.E.R.C. 1980), aff'd sub nom.
Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint
Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983), in order to determine the legal issue of § 7(a)'s applicabil-
ity, the FERC had to assume that the competitors' plans were "equally well
adapted." See id. at 349. In the other case, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-
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original licensee.' 2 If applicable, a state or municipality could take
over an existing project by submitting a proposal as good as, but no
better than, that of the expiring-license holder. '3 The successor would
need to compensate the predecessor licensee for only its "net invest-
ment" plus "severance damages,' 4 which would approximate the cost
Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed,
No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983), the FERC found the incumbent private
utility's proposal superior. Id. at 61,201.
Because the FERC has had so few opportunities to evaluate applicants' plans in the
context of a relicensing contest, it may be instructive to examine the Commission's
procedures in other hydroelectric licensing proceedings. One judge has found that in
issuing preliminary permits for water power projects, see infra note 141, the FERC
has regularly relied on tie-breaking procedures without first adequately evaluating
which proposal is best adapted. City of Dothan v. FERC, 684 F.2d 159, 166 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (Mikva, J. dissenting). In his dissent in Dothan, Judge Mikva commented,
"[w]hen the tie-breaking rule is invoked in each and every case, one must conclude
that FERC's definition of a 'tie' is somewhat extraordinary." Id.
11. Section 7(a) also contains provisions which give preference to states and
municipalities at the initial licensing stage. 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982). See infra notes
56-58 and accompanying text. The applicability of preference in initial licensings is
not addressed by this Note.
12. See, e.g., Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating
Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,175, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 345
(F.E.R.C. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific
Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH)
61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983). The typical
scenario in which this issue arises involves an investor-owned utility company that
has constructed and operated a hydroelectric-generating facility pursuant to a 50-
year license which is about to expire. See, e.g., Pacific Power, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH)
at 61,175; Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 347-48. A municipal utility
challenges the incumbent's renewal application, seeking to invoke the preference
mechanism of § 7(a) to acquire the new license for the existing project at a price
approximating cost of construction 50 years earlier. See Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) at 346-48. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
The term "original licensee" is used throughout this Note to refer to the predecessor
licensee in possession of an expiring or expired license, who may or may not be the
first or initial licensee.
13. See City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 349 (F.E.R.C. 1980),
aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-
Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed,
No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982); Petition, supra
note 2, at 17-18; FERC Upsets Bountiful Decision; Reverses Judge on Merwin Dam,
Nat'l A. Regulatory Util. Commissioners Bull., Oct. 17, 1983, at 19.
14. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 807(a), 808(a) (1982). Net investment is defined in § 3(13)
of the Act, id. § 796(13), as original cost plus additions and betterments, minus
amounts accumulated from earnings in excess of a fair return on the investment, such
as accumulated depreciation. Id. Net investment compensation is "not to exceed the
fair value of the property taken." Id. § 807(a). At congressional hearings on the water
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of construction.15 This cost-related amount would typically be a mere
fraction of the facility's fair market value or replacement cost.16 If the
section 7(a) preference were inapplicable, a state or municipality
would prevail only by submitting the best proposal.1 7 If unsuccessful
in relicensing proceedings, it could acquire a privately-developed
project only by eminent domain condemnation, paying compensation
at fair market value. 18
The few administrative and judicial interpretations of section 7(a)
to date have left the status of the relicensing preference issue un-
clear. "'9 In the most recent decision, Pacific Power & Light Co. v.
power bill, an administration spokesman explained that net investment "eliminates
entirely from the price to be paid any increases in value due to lands owned by the
licensee and used in connection with the license [and] any increases in value due to its
water rights." Water Power: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Water Power,
65th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1918) (statement of O.C. Merrill, Chief Eng'r, Forest Serv.)
[hereinafter cited as 1918 Hearings].
Severance damages are to compensate for "reasonable damage" to dependent
property not taken, "caused by the severance therefrom of property taken." 16
U.S.C. § 807(a) (1982).
15. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 346 (F.E.R.C. 1980),
aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power & Light
Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); 1980 FERC Ann. Rep. 42;
see 16 U.S.C. § 796(13) (1982) ("net investment" includes "original cost" plus "costs
of additions"); Nowak, Cochran & Leitch, supra note 2, at 10, col. 2 (compensation
standard based on "cost-related" calculation).
16. See City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 346 (F.E.R.C.
1980), aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); 1980 FERC Ann. Rep. 42;
Nowak, Cochran & Leitch, supra note 3, at 10, col. 2; Turner, Public Utility Fights
for Private Dam, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1983, § 1, at 20, col. 1. Pacific Power & Light
Co. calculates the replacement cost of its Merwin Dam at $800 million, yet estimates
it would receive only $10 million in compensation if a municipal challenger were to
prevail through the relicensing preference mechanism of § 7(a). Moore, DOJ Per-
forms About-Face On Utilities, Legal Times, May 16, 1983, at 10, col. 2 [hereinafter
cited as Moore II]; Hershey, Power Plant Fight Grows, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1983, at
D2, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Hershey II]. The $10 million net investment compen-
sation represents the depreciated value of the dam, which cost $20 million to build in
1929. Turner, supra, at 20, col. 3.
17. See 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1982); Petition, supra note 2, at 17-18.
18. See City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 346 (F.E.R.C. 1980),
aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power & Light
Co. v. Clark-Co'wlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); 16 U.S.C. § 807(a) (1982);
1980 FERC Ann. Rep. 42.
19. E.g., Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency,
25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29,
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Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency,2 0 the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (FERC or Commission)2 1 held the municipal prefer-
ence2 2 inapplicable against original licensees seeking renewal.2 3 The
newly-appointed commissioners thereby overruled 24 their predeces-
sors' decision in City of Bountiful,25 which had been affirmed by the
1983); City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344 (F.E.R.C. 1980), aff'd
sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-
Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed,
No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); see Nowak, Cochran & Leitch, supra note 3,
at 16, col. 1. See infra note 42.
20. 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 29, 1983).
21. The FERC was established pursuant to the Department of Energy Organiza-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 401(a), 91 Stat. 565, 582 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7171(a) (Supp. V 1981)). As of October 1, 1977, it assumed regulatory responsibil-
ity over water power development previously held by the Federal Power Commission
(FPC)-which ceased to exist as of that date. See 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V
1981); 1982 FERC Ann. Rep. 28. For purposes of this Note, use of the term "Com-
mission" refers to the FPC in contexts before October 1, 1977 and to the FERC in
contexts thereafter.
22. Although § 7(a) provides a preference for applications "by States and munici-
palities," 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982), for convenience this Note refers to this prefer-
ence only as municipal preference. States, however, are entitled to the same prefer-
ence as are municipalities. See id.
23. Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25
FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,176, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 29, 1983).
24. Id.
25. 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344 (F.E.R.C. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Alabama
Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573
(1983), overruled, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating
Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 29, 1983). The three commissioners who voted to overrule Bountiful were new
appointees, whereas one of the two dissenters had served on the unanimous Bountiful
Commission. See Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating
Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,225-5 n.1 (Sheldon, Comm'r, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part), appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
29, 1983); FERC Restates Position on Hydro Relicensing, Decides Fate of Merwin
Dam, Pub. Util. Fort., Oct. 13, 1983, at 35, 35-36 [hereinafter cited as FERC
Restates Position]; Nowak, Cochran & Leitch, supra note 3, at 10, col. 3. Bountiful
was the first competitive relicensing proceeding in which the issue of municipal
preference was fully considered. See Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 346-
47 & n.10; 1980 FERC Ann. Rep. 42. In two previous relicensings, Escondido Mut.
Water Co., 28 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 257 (F.E.R.C. 1979), rev'd, 692 F.2d 1223
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 272 (1983), and Carolina Power & Light
Co., 14 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 554 (F.P.C. 1976) (per curiam), challengers had
claimed entitlement to municipal preference under § 7(a), but the Commission ruled
that they were not municipalities within the definition of § 3(7), 16 U.S.C. § 796(7)
(1982), see supra note 8, and therefore the question of § 7(a)'s applicability to
relicensings was not reached. See Escondido, 28 Pub. Utfl. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 301,
374; Carolina, 14 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 556.
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Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.2 6 Pacific Power repre-
26. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint
Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983).
The validity of the FERC's overruling Bountiful, particularly in view of the 11th
Circuit's affirmance, has been questioned. See Application for Rehearing of the City
of Santa Clara, California, and the City of Bountiful, Utah at 88-90, Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, reh'g denied, 25 FERC Rep.
(CCH) 61,290 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Rehearing Application]; The Clark-
Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency's Request for Rehearing of Opinion No. 191 at 10-
21, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, reh'g
denied, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,290 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Rehearing
Request]; Joint Application for Rehearing of Intervenors the American Public Power
Association, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District, the Northern California
Power Agency and the Cities of Anaheim, Azusa, Banning, Colton, and Riverside,
California at 24-40, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating
Agency, reh'g denied, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,290 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Joint Application]. Nevertheless, the majority in Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-
Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed,
No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983), concluded that there was "no legal impedi-
ment to the Commission's overruling its erroneous Bountiful decision." Id. at 61,177.
The overruling of Bountiful in Pacific Power, however, appears to have been dictum
because the Commission never reached the tie-breaker threshold, and therefore had
no reason to rule on the applicability of § 7(a)'s tie-breaking preference. See Pacific
Power, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) at 61,224 (Sheldon, Comm'r, concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Whereas Bountiful decided the legal issue of § 7(a)'s applicability
to relicensings, see Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 349, Pacific Power was
limited to deciding the factual issue of an applicant's entitlement to preference, see
Pacific Power, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) at 61,176. It is argued, therefore, that in
adjudicating the factual question in Pacific Power, the FERC should have been
bound by its legal holding in Bountiful, as affirmed by the l1th Circuit. See Rehear-
ing Application, supra, at 88-90; Rehearing Request, supra, at 10-12; Joint Applica-
tion, supra, at 24-32. Furthermore, no party in Pacific Power asked the FERC to
overrule Bountiful or to reconsider the legal question of § 7(a)'s applicability in
relicensings. See Pacific Power, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) at 61,224 & n.2 (Sheldon,
Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part); Rehearing Application, supra, at
90; Rehearing Request, supra, at 16-21; Joint Application, supra, at 35. The parties
in Pacific Power appeared to have accepted Bountiful as controlling because they
were intervenors therein, Pacific Power, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) at 61,225-5 n.2; see
Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 348 & nn.12, 14, and the Bountiful
Commission declared that pending relicensing applications "should go forward in the
light of this declaratory order." Id. at 381. This presumption of finality was echoed
by the l1th Circuit in its affirmance of Bountiful. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685
F.2d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled,
Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep.
(CCH) 1 61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983). In the
three years between Bountiful and Pacific Power, there was no change in the statute
or in other factors which might warrant a reversal of the law. Pacific Power, 25
FERC Rep. (CCH) at 61,224 (Sheldon, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Rehearing Application, supra, at 90. The only change was in the composition
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sented the third position on the relicensing issue that the politically-
appointed bipartisan Commission has taken since 1967.27
Because hydroelectric project licenses will expire with increasing
frequency in the next decade,28 a definitive determination must be
made as to the applicability of section 7(a) to relicensings involving
original licensees.29 Billions of dollars weigh in the balance, 30 as mu-
of the politically-appointed Commission. Pacific Power, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) at
61,224 & n.1 (Sheldon, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is
argued, therefore, that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata should
have barred Pacific Power's relitigation of the statutory construction issue between
parties that had participated in Bountiful. See id. at 61,225-5 n.2; Rehearing Appli-
cation, supra, at 11; Rehearing Request, supra, at 13-14; Joint Application, supra, at
25-26. Even a brief of the Commission itself acknowledged that "[u]nder traditional
res judicata principles," Bountiful may be binding on these parties in "any future
relicensing proceeding." Brief of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on
Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit at 8-9, Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573
(1983). The resolution of the question of Bountiful's binding effect, however, is
beyond the scope of this Note.
27. In 1968, at congressional hearings to amend the FPA, Authority of FPC to
License and Take Over Hydroelectric Projects: Hearings on H.R. 12698 and H.R.
12699 Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter cited as
1968 House Hearings]; United States Relicensing or Recapture of Licensed Hydro-
electric Projects: Hearings on S. 2445 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Senate Hearings], FPC spokesmen
stated that municipal preference was not applicable in a relicensing contest between
the existing licensee and a challenger. 1968 House Hearings, supra, at 34 (statement
of Richard A. Solomon, General Counsel, FPC); 1968 Senate Hearings, supra, at 14
(statement of Lee C. White, Chairman, FPC). See infra note 156 and accompanying
text. In 1980, the FERC held that municipal preference was applicable in all reli-
censings. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 349 (F.E.R.C. 1980),
aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-
Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed,
No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983). In 1983, the FERC overruled Bountiful and
held that municipal preference was not applicable against an original licensee seek-
ing renewal. Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency,
25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,176, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 29, 1983).
28. See 1982 FERC Ann. Rep. 31-33 (Forty-three project licenses held by non-
governmental entities will expire between January 1, 1984 and January 1, 1989.);
Edison Elec. Inst., The Benefits to Consumers from Hydroelectric Projects Operated
by Investor-Owned Utilities 4 (1983) (Approximately 168 investor-owned utility
projects will be subject to relicensing by January 1, 1994.).
29. See Petition, supra note 2, at 12-13; Edison Electric Institute, supra note 28,
at 16; Nowak, Cochran & Leitch, supra note 3, at 10, col. 1; see also FERC Restates
Position, supra note 25, at 36 (quoting John Vance, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.)
("Relicensing is expensive and consumers cannot depend upon the decisions of a
changing commission.").
30. See Petition, supra note 2, at 14 & n.22; Hershey, Ruling Backs Private




nicipalities with plans as well adapted as those of incumbent licensees
stand to acquire sources of relatively inexpensive power3' for far less
than the current cost of developing such facilities. 32
This Note analyzes section 7(a) within the framework of traditional
principles of statutory construction. It reviews the background, pur-
poses and pertinent provisions of the FPA. The language of the Act is
analyzed and found to include a limited relicensing preference for
municipalities, applicable only when the original licensee is not com-
peting for a new license. Examination of the legislative history finds it
inconclusive, yet suggests a congressional intent consistent with the
language of limited preference. This Note concludes that section 7(a)
does not give municipalities a relicensing preference over incumbent
private utilities when both of their plans are equally well adapted to
serve the public interest.
I. THE FEDERAL PowER ACT
A. Purposes
The FPA, originally enacted as the Federal Water Power Act of
1920, 33 terminated the controversy between private power interests
seeking rapid development of hydroelectric power, and anti-monop-
oly conservationists opposing unregulated "giveaways" of government
lands. 34 Because public capital at the time was insufficient to finance
31. See Petition, supra note 2, at 16; Thorpe, supra note 4, at 17, col. 4; Wall St.
J., May 2, 1983, at 20, col. 4; Moore I, supra note 1, at 10, col. 2.
32. See Turner, supra note 16, § 1, at 20, col. 1; Moore II, supra note 16, at 10,
col. 2. Private utilities fear that if they ultimately lose Pacific Power & Light Co. v.
Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal
docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983), municipalities will take over every
hydro project that comes up for relicensing. Turner, supra note 16, at 20, col 1.; see
Moore I, supra note 1, at 10, col. 2 (quoting Hugh Smith, attorney for Pacific Power
& Light Co.). See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
33. Ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920); see generally Note, The Federal Power Act, 73
U. Pa. L. Rev. & Am. L. Reg. 142 (1924) (general discussion of purposes, provisions
and constitutionality of FWPA) [hereinafter cited as Power Act].
34. See First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 180 & n.23 (1946);
City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 351 (F.E.R.C. 1980), aff'd sub
nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power & Light Co. v.
Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal
docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); see H.R. Rep. No. 61, 66th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1919) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep. No. 61]; H.R. Rep. No. 715, 65th
Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1918) (minority report) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep. No. 715];
Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective Federal Water Power Legislation, 14 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 9, 11, 18 (1945); FERC Restates Position, supra note 25, at 36.
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dam construction, 35 the Wilson administration sought to encourage
private investors to develop the nation's water power resources. 36
Private development under the FPA was conditioned, however, to
protect the public interest.37
In enacting the FPA, Congress sought to ensure an abundant supply
of economical electric power, while seeking to maintain a proper
regard for the conservation of natural resources. 38 The Act established
national policy to promote the widespread development of water
power, 39 while providing for comprehensive federal control over the
use of navigable waters.4 0 To these ends, Congress created the Federal
Power Commission (FPC)-now the FERC41-to coordinate the ad-
35. Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25
FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,183, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 29, 1983); see City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 378
(F.E.R.C. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific
Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH)
61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); 1918 Hearings,
supra note 14, at 53 (testimony of Rep. Sims, Chairman, House Comm. on Water
Power).
36. See S. Rep. No. 180, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1919) [hereinafter cited as S.
Rep. No. 180]; H.R. Rep. No. 715, supra note 34, at 15; 1918 Hearings, supra note
14, at 62 (statement of O.C. Merrill, Chief Eng'r, Forest Serv.). Because wartime
inflation had put many private utility companies in precarious financial conditions,
the Wilson administration proposed the licensing of water power developments to
overcome the utilities' "uncertainty of tenure" and thereby restore their financial
stability. Id. at 17-19; see H.R. Rep. No. 715, supra note 34, at 29 (letters of Feb. 27,
1918 from Secretaries of War, the Interior & Agriculture to Rep. Sims).
37. 1918 Hearings, supra note 14, at 19 (statement of O.C. Merrill, Chief Eng'r,
Forest Serv.); see S. Rep. No. 180, supra note 36, at 5; H.R. Rep. No. 61, supra note
34, at 5 (quoting report of D.F. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture); H.R. Rep. No.
715, supra note 34, at 29 (letters of Feb. 27, 1918 from Secretaries of War, the
Interior & Agriculture to Rep. Sims).
38. 1969 Hearing, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Lee C. White, Chairman,
FPC); see First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 180 & n.23 (1946); S.
Rep. No. 180, supra note 36, at 3; H.R. Rep. No. 61, supra note 34, at 4-5 (quoting
report of D.F. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture); H.R. Rep. No. 715, supra note 34,
at 15.
39. Escondido Mut. Water Co., 28 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 257, 277
(F.E.R.C. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 272 (1983); see Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063
(1920) (preamble); S. Rep. No. 180, supra note 36, at 6; H.R. Rep. No. 61, supra
note 34, at 4-5 (quoting report of D.F. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture); H.R. Rep.
No. 715, supra note 34, at 15; 1918 Hearings, supra note 14, at 62 (statement of O.C.
Merrill, Chief Eng'r, Forest Serv.); 1982 FERC Ann. Rep. 28.
40. Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395, 408 (1975); FPC v.
Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90, 98 (1965); see S. Rep. No. 180, supra note 36, at 8;
H.R. Rep. No. 61, supra note 34, at 4-5 (quoting report of D.F. Houston, Secretary
of Agriculture); Power Act, supra note 33, at 142.
41. See supra note 21.
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ministration of water power regulation previously divided among
three federal agencies. 42
B. Provisions
The FERC is comprised of five members, appointed by the Presi-
dent with the advice and consent of the Senate.43 The Commission is
empowered to issue licenses, 44 not to exceed fifty years, 45 for the
construction, operation, and maintenance of dams and other works
for the development of water power. 46
When faced with competition for licenses, the Commission is re-
quired to consider the public interest, and license the project it judges
"best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing
... waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign com-
merce, for the improvement and utilization of water power develop-
ment, and for other beneficial public uses, including recreational
purposes. ' 47 The FERC may demand the modification of an appli-
cant's proposal before approval. 48
42. Montana Power Co. v. FPC, 445 F.2d 739, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1013 (1971); see H.R. Rep. No. 61, supra note 34, at 5
(quoting report of D.F. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture); H.R. Rep. No. 715,
supra note 34, at 29 (letters of Feb. 27, 1918 from Secretaries of War, the Interior &
Agriculture to Rep. Sims); 1918 Hearings, supra note 14, at 25 (statement of O.C.
Merrill, Chief Eng'r, Forest Serv.). Prior to creation of the FPC, water power
development was administered as follows: The Department of Agriculture regulated
hydro sites in national forests; the Department of the Interior oversaw Indian reser-
vations and public lands; and the War Department controlled navigable waters.
Montana Power, 445 F.2d at 750; 1977 FPC Final Ann. Rep. 6; see 56 Cong. Rec.
9110 (1918) (remarks of Rep. Sims).
43. 16 U.S.C. § 792 (1982).
44. Id. § 7 7(e); Hydro Resources, supra note 1, at xxxii.
45. 16 U.S.C. § 799 (1982); Hydro Resources, supra note 1, at xxxii.
46. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1982); Hydro Resources, supra note 1, at xxxii; see Udall
v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 450 (1967). The Commission's authority to issue hydropower
project licenses in relation to navigable waters is derived from the commerce clause
of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 442-
43 (1955); see Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395, 400 (1975);
Wheeler, The Federal Power Commission as an Agency of Congress, 14 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1, 2 (1945); Power Act, supra note 33, at 146.
47. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1982); see Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 450 (1967);
Citizens for Allergan County, Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Pacific Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 333 F.2d 689,
692 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 969 (1965); Namekagon Hydro Co. v.
FPC, 216 F.2d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 1954); Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz
Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,176, appeal docketed,
No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); 1969 Hearing, supra note 3, at 5 (statement
of Lee C. White, Chairman, FPC); 1918 Hearings, supra note 14, at 95 (statement of
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The Act provides several mechanisms for government entities to
acquire hydroelectric projects under license to private parties. The
United States or any state or municipality may use its power of
eminent domain to take over licensed facilities at any time.49 The
appropriating authority must pay "just compensation" 50-an amount
approximating fair market value. 51 At the expiration of a license, the
United States may automatically acquire private power facilities by
compensating the incumbent for only its "net investment" plus "sever-
ance damages. '52 While the federal government has an absolute right
to recapture licensed projects at expiration, a state or municipality
seeking to obtain an expiring license must enter the normal applica-
tion process. Then, if its plan is deemed best adapted to serve the
public interest, the state or municipality will prevail. 53 In such a case,
the state or municipality need compensate the original licensee for
only its "net investment" and "severance damages.154 By asserting that
the section 7(a) preference is applicable to all relicensings, however,
the public power interests seek to prevail when their proposal is as
good as, but no better than, that of other applicants, including the
predecessor licensee. 55
C. Preference Provision
Should the Commission judge that no plan is "best adapted" to
serve the public interest, the Act stipulates how ties are to be broken in
certain circumstances. Section 7(a) specifies three situations in which
preference must be given to a state or municipality, provided its
proposal is judged "equally well adapted ... to conserve and utilize
O.C. Merrill, Chief Eng'r, Forest Serv.); Hydro Resources, supra note 1, at xxxii; cf.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1969) (FCC required to
consider public interest in issuing and renewing broadcast licenses).
48. 16 U.S.C. §§ 800(a), 803(a) (1982); see Holyoke Water Power Co., 8 F.P.C.
471, 488 (1949); Petition, supra note 2, at 19.
49. 16 U.S.C. § 807(a) (1982); 1980 FERC Ann. Rep. 42.
50. 16 U.S.C. § 807(a) (1982).
51. See Almota Farmers Elevators & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S.
470, 473-74 (1973); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); United States v.
103.38 Acres of Land, 660 F.2d 208, 211 (6th Cir. 1981); 1980 FERC Ann. Rep. 42.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 807(a) (1982). See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
53. See 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1982); see also Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-
Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,182 (adver-
sary relicensings between municipality and original licensee should be decided under
the "best adapted" standard), appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29,
1983); Letter from Lee C. White, Chairman, FPC, to Rep. Clarence Brown, Jr.
(Mar. 28, 1969) (license issued to applicant with best adapted plans), reprinted in
1969 Hearing, supra note 3, at 46-47.
54. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 807(a), 808(a) (1982). See supra notes 14-15 and accompa-
nying text.
55. See infra notes 62-94 and accompanying text.
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in the public interest the water resources of the region."'5 6 The first
two situations-"[i]n issuing preliminary permits hereunder or li-
censes where no preliminary permit has been issued" 57-pertain only
to initial licensings. 8 The third situation involves relicensings: "in
issuing licenses to new licensees under section [15 hereof.]"59 The
meaning of this third clause, particularly the term "new licensees," is
the crux of the current relicensing controversy because incumbent
private utilities claim that municipal preference was not meant to be
applicable against them as original-not new-licensees.6 0
II. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF SECTION 7(A)
A. Language of Section 7(a)
Private and public utilities have accorded different meanings6' to
the clause, "in issuing licenses to new licensees under section [15
hereof] the Commission shall give preference to applications therefor
56. 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982).
57. Id.
58. See Cities of Anaheim & Riverside v. FERC, 692 F.2d 773, 780-81 (Mikva,
J., concurring); Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating
Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,182, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); City of Bountiful, 28 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 373
(F.E.R.C. 1980), afJ'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific
Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH)
61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); 1980 FERC Ann.
Rep. 42. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
59. 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982). Section 15, id. § 808, is entitled "New licenses and
renewals." Id.
60. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 349-50 (F.E.R.C.
1980), af-'d sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052
(1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); Massella, supra
note 10, at 60; Moore I, supra note 1, at 10, col. 3; see Petition, supra note 2, at 20;
Initial Brief of Petitioner Alabama Power Co. & Hydroelectric Util. Co. Group at 4,
Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Initial Brief].
61. Analysis of the language of § 7(a) is the first step toward determining its
meaning. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Cheme-
huevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395, 400 (1975); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.01, at 48 (4th ed. 1973); cf. International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979) (Securities Act of 1933)
(quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell,
J., concurring)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (same). If the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it should be enforced according to its
terms unless absurd results would occur. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 184 n.29 (1978); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949); see Pacific Power &
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by States and municipalities. 6 2 Private power interests define "new
licensees" as other than original licensees.6 3 Public power interests
interpret the phrase to refer to any licensee under a new license.
6 4
The municipalities' definition of "new licensees" as "any licensees"
reduces the term "new" to mere surplusageO5 and thereby fails to give
significance and effect to Congress' language.66 The public power
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 1 61,052,
at 61,179-80, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); 2A C. Sands,
supra, § 46.01, at 48. When ambiguity exists, extrinsic considerations such as legisla-
tive history should be consulted. United Shoe Workers of Am. v. Bedell, 506 F.2d
174, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States,
288 U.S. 294, 317 (1933)); In re Lambert, 203 F.2d 607, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1953);
National Audubon Soc. v. Department of Water, 496 F. Supp. 499, 508 (E.D. Cal.
1980); see United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir.
1980); 2A C. Sands, supra, § 48.01, at 181-82.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982). "New licensees" appears to have been a poor
choice of words because a non-incumbent applicant for a successor license does not
technically become a licensee until after it is issued a new license. City of Bountiful,
37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 369 n.38 (F.E.R.C. 1980), af-'d sub nom.
Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-
Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed,
No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983).
63. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 362 (F.E.R.C. 1980),
aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power & Light
Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); Petition, supra note 2, at
20; Initial Brief, supra note 60, at 4; see Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d
1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other
grounds, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25
FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29,
1983).
64. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 349-50 (F.E.R.C.
1980), aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-
Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed,
No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); Massella, supra note 10, at 60.
65. See Petition, supra note 2, at 23. The word "new" cannot mean "any"
because "new," by definition, excludes that which is old. See Baum v. Segal, 89 F.
Supp. 716, 717 (D.N.J. 1950); Black's Law Dictionary 940 (5th ed. 1979). "Any"
would include both new and old. See Keystone Tankship Corp. v. Williamette Iron
& Steel Co., 222 F. Supp. 320, 322 (D. Or. 1963); Initial Brief, supra note 60, at 11;
Black's Law Dictionary 86 (5th ed. 1979).
66. Significance and effect must be given, if possible, to every word of a statute.
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979); United States v. Menasche, 348
U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882));
National Insulation Transp. Comm. v. ICC, 683 F.2d 533, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 856 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 917 (1973); 2A C. Sands, supra note 61, § 46.06, at 63; see United States v.
Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 1982).
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interests contend, however, that the term "new" has significance
because it distinguishes long-term licensees from temporary annual
licensees67 -to which preference would not apply.6 8 Without this
modifier, they argue, these two categories of licensees might be con-
fused.69
This argument is illogical. Had Congress intended to distinguish
long-term licensees from temporary annual licensees, it presumably
would have used a more precise qualifying term such as "long-term"
or "non-annual" licensees. 70 By using the modifier "new," the legisla-
tors apparently intended to distinguish "new licensees" from "original
licensees" in possession of expiring licenses.
The municipalities contend, however, that even accepting the pri-
vate utilities' definition, preference would still be applicable in all
competitive relicensings. 71 Because the prefatory phrase, "in issuing
licenses," refers to a decisional process and should not be restricted to
the ministerial act of issuance, it is argued that section 7(a) should be
read to mean "in considering applications of new licensees. '72 Under
67. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 362 n.30 (F.E.R.C.
1980), aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); see Joint Application, supra
note 26, at 12 & n.5.
68. Joint Application, supra note 26, at 12 n.5; see 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982).
69. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 362 n.30 (F.E.R.C.
1980), af-f'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); see Joint Application, supra
note 26, at 12.
70. Although FERC regulations define a "new license" as "any license.., except
an annual license," 18 C.F.R. § 4.50(b)(7) (1983), it does not follow that the term
"new licensee" had to be used to specify any licensee except an annual licensee.
Moreover, the term "licensee" is not defined in FERC regulations nor in the FPA.
71. See City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 371 & n.44
(F.E.R.C. 1980), affd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific
Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH)
61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); Rehearing
Application, supra note 26, at 19; Rehearing Request, supra note 26, at 23; Joint
Application, supra note 26, at 13.
72. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 371 n.44 (F.E.R.C.
1980), aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); see Rehearing Application,
supra note 26, at 16-17; Rehearing Request, supra note 26, at 23; Joint Application,
supra note 26, at 13.
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this reading, the preference would apply whenever a potential "new
licensee" is among the applicants under consideration-that is, in
every competitive relicensing situation.
This argument, as well, is tenuous. Had Congress intended the
preference to be applicable in all relicensings, there would have been
no need to use the limiting phrase "to new licensees." 73 The statute
simply could have read, "in issuing licenses under Section 15." 74 Such
language would have been consistent with that of the other two
municipal preference situations listed in section 7(a)-"[i]n issuing
preliminary permits hereunder or licenses where no preliminary per-
mit has been issued" 75-neither of which is confined to specific types
of potential licensees. By specifying "new licensees," therefore, it is
likely that Congress intended to restrict preference to relicensings
involving a particular class.7 6 Moreover, accepting the interpretation
that preference was meant to be applicable in every competitive
relicensing ignores the provision's limiting language and thus fails to
give significance and effect to every word of the statute. 77
The distinction between "new licensees" and "original licensees"
appears repeatedly in the FPA as well as in its legislative history.7 8
Because terms of a statute should be interpreted consistently, unless
clear evidence exists that Congress intended otherwise, 79 the meaning
73. A legislature is presumed to have used no superfluous words. Wilderness
Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 856 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973);
see United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955); 2A C. Sands, supra note
62, § 46.06.
74. Initial Brief, supra note 60, at 13; see Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-
Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,180 (1983),
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982).
76. See Initial Brief, supra note 60, at 13.
77. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
78. Petition, supra note 2, at 24; see, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 807(a) (1982) ("new
licensee" issued new license on condition that it pay compensation to, and assume
contracts of, "original licensee"); id. § 815 (if new license not issued to "original
licensee," then "new licensee" shall fulfill all existing contracts to furnish power);
H.R. Rep. No. 61, supra note 34, at 8 (at expiration, new license may be issued to
"original licensee" or to "new licensee"); H.R. Rep. No. 715, supra note 34, at 18(same); 1918 Hearings, supra note 14, at 30 (statement of O.C. Merrill, Chief Eng'r,
Forest Serv.) ("new licensee" must buy out "original licensee").
79. See United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S. 600, 606-07 (1941); Helvering v.
Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc.
v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932); Firestone v. Howerton, 671 F.2d 317, 320
& n.6 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nunez, 573 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir.) (quoting
Lewellyn v. Harbison, 31 F.2d 740, 742 (3d Cir. 1929)), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930
(1978); Strachan Shipping Co. v. Davis, 571 F.2d 968, 974 (5th Cir. 1978); Curry v.
Block, 541 F. Supp. 506, 518 (S.D. Ga. 1982); 2A C. Sands, supra note 61, § 46.05,
at 56; see also Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam)
(similarity of language indicates different statutes should be interpreted consistently).
1984]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
of "new licensees" should be the same in section 7(a) as elsewhere in
the Act. 0 In every section in which it appears, the term "new li-
censees" intentionally excludes "original licensees." 8' Consistent inter-
pretation is especially appropriate in the case of section 7(a) because
the "new licensees" phrase therein is explicitly cross-referenced to
section 1582 which covers relicensings.8 3 Specifically, section 15(a)
authorizes the Commission "at the expiration of the original license,
.. . to issue a new license to the original licensee [or] to a new
licensee."'8 4 In this context, the "original licensee" is the holder of the
expiring license seeking renewal, and a "new licensee" is any other
applicant vying for the new license.8  Carrying this mutually-exclu-
sive meaning back to section 7(a), municipal preference would be
applicable only in issuing licenses to applicants other than original
licensees.
Municipalities may contend, however, that the meaning of "new
licensees" in section 15(a) cannot be read into section 7(a) because the
contexts of usage are different. 86 "New licensees" is used in section
15(a) to distinguish successor licensees from predecessors, in the con-
80. Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25
FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,179, 61,219 n.12, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); see Petition, supra note 2, at 3-4; cf. Nachman Corp. v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 388 n.5 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(term "nonforfeitable" presumed to have same meaning in different titles of ERISA,
particularly because titles enacted in tandem to function together); Strachan Ship-
ping Co. v. Davis, 571 F.2d 968, 974 (5th Cir. 1978) (phrase "knowledge of injury"
interpreted consistently throughout Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act); American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Planned Mktg. Assocs., 389 F.
Supp. 1141, 1146 (E.D. Va. 1974) (phrase "business of insurance" presumed to have
identical meaning in different parts of McCarran-Ferguson Act).
81. Petition, supra note 2, at 22. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
82. Joint Application, supra note 26, at 10-11; see 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982).
83. 16 U.S.C. § 808 (1982).
84. Id. § 808(a).
85. Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25
FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,179, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 29, 1984); see H.R. Rep. No. 715, supra note 34, at 18; Initial Brief, supra note
60, at 8. This distinction is further evidenced by later language in § 15(a) which
stipulates that a "new license" for a project covered by an original license "shall be
issued on the condition that the new licensee shall, before taking possession of such
project or projects, pay such [compensation], and assume such contracts as the
United States is required to do in the manner specified in section [14 hereof]." 16
U.S.C. § 808(a) (1982). Because the payment of compensation and the assumption of
contracts are not conditions that an incumbent would have to meet before its license
is renewed, the reference to "new licensee" necessarily excludes an original licensee in
possession of an expiring license.
86. See City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 369 (F.E.R.C.
1980), aJJ'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power &
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text of successive license terms. It is used in section 7(a), they claim, to
distinguish potential recipients of long-term licenses from recipients of
annual licenses.8 7
Use of the modifier "new" with "licensees" in section 7(a), however,
was not meant to distinguish long-term from annual licensees because
Congress presumably would have chosen more precise language had it
intended such a distinction. 8 Moreover, the municipalities' interpre-
tation would result in inconsistent use of the term "new licensees."' 9
Therefore, although the contexts of sections 7(a) and 15(a) may not be
identical, there is no basis to conclude that Congress intended "new
licensees" to have different meanings in the two sections. 90 Addition-
ally, "new licensees" was used consistently throughout the legislative
history to the exclusion of "original licensees." 91 As a result, it is
unlikely that Congress intended "new licensees" to have a meaning in
section 7(a) different from that elsewhere in the Act and its legislative
history.
The language of section 7(a)-although not clear and unambiguous
on its face-appears to limit the municipal preference to relicensings
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); Joint Application, supra
note 26, at 12 & n.5.
87. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 362 n.30 (F.E.R.C.
1980), afj'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); Joint Application, supra
note 26, at 12 n.5.
88. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
90. Nevertheless, in City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344
(F.E.R.C. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled, Pacific Power & Light
Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983), the Commission concluded
that "there is no reason to require the term 'new licensees,' when used alone in § 7(a),
to have the same meaning as the term 'new licensee' when used in correlation with
'original licensee' in §§ 15(a) and 22." Id. at 371. There is, however, good reason to
conclude that "new licensees" should be interpreted consistently-in accordance with
basic rules of statutory interpretation. See supra note 79. The Commission's conclu-
sion that Congress intended "new licensees" to have a different meaning when used
alone, see Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 371, however, violates this rule
of consistent interpretation. The FERC supported its theory by noting that the
precise meaning of "original licensee" in § 8-where the term is used alone-is
slightly different from its meaning in §§ 15(a) and 22-where the term is used in
correlation with "new licensee." Id. But because "original licensee" may not have
precisely the same meaning when used alone as when used as a correlative term does
not, however, justify the FERC's conclusion that "new licensee" has a significantly
different meaning when used alone in § 7(a) than when used together with "original
licensee" in § 15(a).
91. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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not involving an original licensee. Presence of the modifying phrase
"to new licensees," indicates Congress' intent to restrict the applicabil-
ity of the preference to some, but not all relicensings. Such an inter-
pretation is consistent with the use of "new licensees" elsewhere in the
FPA92 and throughout its legislative history.9 3 For this meaning to be
enforceable, however, it must not lead to absurd results. 94 It is neces-
sary, therefore, to examine the ramifications of this plain meaning.
B. Results of Enforcing Apparent Meaning
Public power interests contend that limiting section 7(a)'s prefer-
ence to relicensings not involving original licensees may lead to the
following absurd results: 1) Municipalities with original licenses
would lose their preference when applying for renewal;95 2) a regula-
tory gap would be created; 96 and 3) perpetual licenses would result. 7
Analysis of these three concerns reveals that the results of enforcing
the statute's apparent plain meaning will be neither absurd nor at
odds with legislative intent.
1. Loss of Initial Preference
If section 7(a) is inapplicable to situations involving original li-
censees, a municipality that acquired an original license through the
FPA's initial-license preferences would not receive preference when
92. See supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
95. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power & Light
Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); City of Bountiful, 37 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 374 (F.E.R.C. 1980), ajf'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co.
v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983),
overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power & Light Co., 25 FERC Rep. (CCH)
61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); see Rehearing
Application, supra note 26, at 27; Rehearing Request, supra note 26, at 25; Joint
Application, supra note 26, at 16 n.9.
96. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 374 (F.E.R.C. 1980),
afJ'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power & Light
Co., 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
29, 1983); Joint Application, supra note 26, at 12-13; see Rehearing Request, supra
note 26, at 24.
97. Joint Application, supra note 26, at 16; see Alabama Power Co. v. FERC,
685 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled
on other grounds, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating




seeking renewal. s Public power interests assert that it is inconsistent
for a municipality which is not in possession and is seeking an initial
license, to receive preference, yet lose that preference when it is in
possession and seeking renewal. 9 Although the municipality would
not technically be preferred in relicensing, the outcome would be the
same as if such a preference were applicable. The municipality, there-
fore, would be unseated only if a competitor were to submit a better
proposal. 00 If the municipality's and challengers' plans were "equally
well adapted," the incumbent municipality would prevail even with-
out a relicensing preference because the Commission has indicated
that, all other factors being equal, ties should be broken in favor of the
original licensee. 10' This is based on a respect for continuity of owner-
ship and a belief that an incumbent's demonstrated performance is
more convincing than a challenger's promises. 102 Consequently, limit-
ing relicensing preference to competitions not involving an original
licensee will not lead to absurd results.
2. Regulatory Gap
The municipalities note that limiting preference to relicensings not
involving original licensees would leave the Commission without
guidelines for breaking ties when incumbents vie for new licenses.
This regulatory gap, they contend, was not intended by Congress. 0 3
98. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
99. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 374 (F.E.R.C. 1980),
aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power & Light
Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); Rehearing Application,
supra note 42, at 27; Rehearing Request, supra note 26, at 25.
100. See Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25
FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,183, appeal docketed, No. 83-2331 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 29, 1983); 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1982).
101. See S. Rep. No. 1338, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1968) [hereinafter cited as S.
Rep. No. 1338]; 1968 House Hearings, supra note 27, at 34 (statement of Richard A.
Solomon, General Counsel, FPC); Letter from Lee C. White, Chairman, FPC to
Hubert H. Humphrey, President of the Senate (Aug. 28, 1967) [hereinafter cited as
White Letter], reprinted in 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 4, 8, and in 113
Cong. Rec. 26,186, 26,187 (1967); see also Initial Brief, supra note 60, at 41-43 (prior
to consideration of FWPA, Congress accepted view that incumbent licensee should
receive favorable consideration in relicensing).
102. See S. Rep. No. 1338, supra note 101, at 3-4; White Letter, supra note 101,
reprinted in 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 8, and in 113 Cong. Rec. 26,187
(1967).
103. See City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 375 (F.E.R.C.
1980), afJ'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
19841
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Congress, however, left other regulatory gaps in section 7(a) that
would continue to exist even if the municipalities' definitions were
accepted. For example, the FPA provides no guidelines for breaking
ties between private utilities or between municipal applicants. 0 4 Be-
cause the legislators left regulatory gaps in both of these situations,
there is little basis for contending that they intended no gap to exist in
relicensing competitions between a private original licensee and a
municipal challenger.
Although the Act may not cover ties involving incumbents, the
Commission has indicated that it would favor original licensees. 0 5
Any regulatory gap, therefore, would be filled by this policy. Thus,
even assuming that a gap exists, it would not lead to results which are
absurd or clearly at odds with congressional intent.
3. Perpetual Licenses
The municipalities claim that private utilities will have de facto
licenses-in-perpetuity if relicensing preference is not applicable
against original licensees. 06 Presuming that incumbents would seek to
renew all lucrative licenses, it is argued that a limited preference is a
worthless preference because it would effectively be limited to unprof-
itable water power projects. 107
Perpetual licenses will not likely result from a limited relicensing
preference because the FPA provides mechanisms to prevent such an
occurrence. Federal, state, and local governments can take over pri-
vate utilities' hydroelectric developments at any time by eminent
domain, on payment of "just compensation."' 08 In addition, section
14(a) provides for federal recapture of any project upon license expira-
tion. 10 Licenses can also change hands through the normal applica-
tion process: Any challenger, public or private, can prevail by submit-
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); Rehearing Request, supra
note 26, at 24.
104. See 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982). The second clause of § 7(a) provides that "as
between other applicants, the Commission may give preference to the applicant the
plans of which it finds and determines are best adapted." Id. The Act, however, does
not address the situation in which these other applicants have equally well adapted
plans.
105. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
106. Joint Application, supra note 10, at 16; see Alabama Power Co. v. FERC,
685 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled
on other grounds, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating
Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 29, 1983).
107. Rehearing Request, supra note 26, at 24; see Rehearing Application, supra
note 26, at 25-26.
108. 16 U.S.C. § 807(a) (1982). See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
109. 16 U.S.C. § 807(a) (1982). See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 52
HYDROELECTRIC RELICENSING
ting the proposal best adapted to serve the public interest. 110 If a
challenger's plan is not superior to the original licensee's, however, the
latter should retain the license because of the value of continuity of
ownership."' A limited preference, therefore, will not lead to perpet-
ual licenses unless government entities choose not to acquire hydro-
electric facilities, and challenging applicants fail to submit superior
proposals-in which case it appears preferable to retain original li-
censees.
Thus, enforcement of the apparent plain meaning of section 7(a)
would not lead to absurd results. Nevertheless, in view of the plausible
statutory interpretations put forth by the public power interests, the
plain meaning is not so clear and unambiguous as to preclude an
examination of the Act's legislative history.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. The Federal Water Power Act of 1920
The municipalities contend that the Wilson administration drafters
wanted their bill to include priority for states and municipalities in all
relicensings," 2 and that such preference remained therein throughout
consideration of the bill.1 3 Analysis of the legislative history, how-
ever, indicates that Congress did not intend so broad a preference in
the enacted statute. This conclusion is reached by analyzing three
critical stages in the development of the Act: 1) the bill as introduced,
which may or may not have implicitly contained a preference for all
relicensings;1 4 2) the bill as first reported out of Conference Commit-
tee, which eliminated any preference that may have existed in the bill
as introduced;" 5 and 3) the bill in final form, as amended by the
Senate Committee on Commerce to include a limited preference for
relicensings. 116
110. See 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1982); Petition, supra note 1, at 28-29.
111. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
112. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 350-51 (F.E.R.C.
1980), aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); Rehearing Request, supra
note 26, at 26; Joint Application, supra note 26, at 16-17.
113. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 350-51 (F.E.R.C.
1980), af'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983).
114. See infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 129-42 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
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1. The Bill as Introduced
The administration bill, introduced January 15, 1918,1 7 provided
in section 7 "[t]hat in issuing licenses," discretionary preference may
be given to states and municipalities for developing power, provided
their plans are "adapted to [serve] ... the public interest."'" 8
Whether this original preference provision was applicable to relicens-
ings at all is disputed by the public and private utilities.
The public power interests contend that a municipal preference
applicable to all relicensings was implicit in the broad phrase "in
issuing licenses."'119 This interpretation is not unreasonable in view of
the absence of any words in the bill restricting preference to initial
licensings.120 The municipalities' conclusion is also supported by other
evidence. At the time of the bill's consideration, there was, for exam-
ple, a general understanding that private licensees should not be given
a right of perpetual use.' 21 Additionally, Forest Service Chief Engi-
neer O.C. Merrill, a principal drafter of the administration bill,
prepared a memorandum of the principles to be embodied in that bill,
including preference for states and municipalities over original li-
censees seeking renewal. 122 Furthermore, during House committee
117. H.R. 8716, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., 56 Cong. Rec. 890 (1918).
118. H.R. 8716, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918), reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 715,
supra note 84, at 21, 24.
119. See City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 355, 372 (F.E.R.C.
1980), affd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on otlzer grounds, Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983).
120. See Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25
FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,180, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 29, 1983); H.R. 8716, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 715,
supra note 34, at 24.
121. See City of Bountiful, 37 Pub, Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 353 (F.E.R.C.
1980), aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); S. Rep. No. 180, supra note
56, at 3; 1918 Hearings, supra note 14, at 32 (testimony of Rep. Ferris).
122. See City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 354 (F.E.R.C. 1980)
(quoting memorandum of O.C. Merrill (Oct. 31, 1917)), aff'd sub nom. Alabama
Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573
(1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz
Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-
2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983). Merrill's memorandum, however, was prepared for
the Secretary of Agriculture in 1917, prior to Merrill's drafting of the administration
bill. Initial Brief, supra note 60, at 26. There is no indication that the memorandum
was made available to Congress, and therefore, there is no basis for concluding that it
evidences legislative intent. Moreover, Merrill's initial draft of the bill did not follow
the priorities set forth in his memorandum. Id.
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hearings, a private-utility spokesman acknowledged that he under-
stood the original bill to give such priority.1 3
In contrast, the Chairman of the House Committee on Water
Power expressed his understanding that the administration bill did not
include any relicensing preference. 12 4 Furthermore, a Committee
member acknowledged that he had been unsuccessful in his effort to
insert provisions in the bill favorable to municipalities. 125 These decla-
rations support the private utilities' view that the bill as introduced
contained a preference for only initial licensings. Their view is rein-
forced by the absence of any reference to relicensing preference in the
lengthy statement to Congress of Merrill, the administration's princi-
pal spokesman. 2 6 In the absence of statutory language explicitly cov-
ering relicensings, there is little basis for concluding that such situa-
tions were implicitly included in the language of the administration
bill. 12 7 This is especially so because there is little in the way of unam-
123. 1918 Hearings, supra note 14, at 200 (statement of E.K. Hall, Vice President,
Electric Bond & Share Co.). It appears, however, that Hall may have understood
municipalities to have priority over incumbents not by way of § 7(a), but only via the
federal recapture provision of § 14(a), 16 U.S.C. § 807(a) (1982), see supra note 52
and accompanying text, whereby Congress can take over an expiring license for the
benefit of a municipality. See 1918 Hearings, supra note 14, at 191, 406 (statement of
E.K. Hall, Vice President, Electric Bond & Share Co.).
124. Id. at 457 (testimony of Rep. Sims).
125. 56 Cong. Rec. 9113 (1918) (remarks of Rep. Taylor).
126. 'See 1918 Hearings, supra note 14, at 8-116 (statement of O.C. Merrill, Chief
Eng'r, Forest Serv.). Despite Merrill's memorandum in support of municipal reli-
censing preference, see supra note 122 and accompanying text, he made no mention
thereof in his 108-page statement before the House Committee on Water Power. See
1918 Hearings, supra note 14, at 8-116 (statement of O.C. Merrill, Chief Eng'r,
Forest Serv.). He explained, and was repeatedly questioned about, procedures to be
followed at the expiration of licenses, yet never mentioned any relicensing prefer-
ence. See id. at 30-36. The only time Merrill addressed the issue of municipal
preference at all during the hearings was in connection with preliminary permits and
initial licenses. See id. at 55. Moreover, he proposed an amendment to the adminis-
tration bill to clarify its preference provisions, but this too dealt with only prelimi-
nary permits and initial licenses. See id. at 890 (letter of May 24, 1918 from O.C.
Merrill to Rep. Sims, Committee Chairman). He suggested that § 7 be amended to
read: "That in issuing preliminary permits for projects or parts thereof, or licenses
where no preliminary permit has been issued, the commission may in its discretion
give preference to applications by States and municipalities .... ." Id. Here again,
there was no mention of preference in relicensings. By specifying these two situa-
tions, Merrill raised a negative implication that the administration bill was not
meant to give preference in other situations, such as relicensings. See infra note 132
and accompanying text.
127. Cf. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969) ("Legislative silence is a poor
beacon to follow in discerning the proper statutory route."); Gemsco, Inc. v. Wall-
ing, 324 U.S. 244, 260 (1945) (plain meaning of Fair Labor Standards Act not
overcome by strained inferences from ambiguous legislative history); Scripps-Ho-
ward Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942) ("The search for significance in the
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biguous statements in the legislative history to support the municipali-
ties' contention as to meaning.' 2  Even if their interpretation were
correct, however, any relicensing preference that existed implicitly in
the broad language of the bill as introduced was deleted by the
Conference Committee's amendment.
2. Conference Committee Amendment
The bill as reported out of the Conference Committee, February
26, 1919,129 provided for a mandatory tie-breaking preference "in
issuing preliminary permits . . . or licenses where no preliminary
permit has been issued."'130 Thus, any relicensing preference that
could have been inferred from the broad "in issuing licenses" language
of the administration bill was eliminated by amendment.' 3 ' More-
over, because the conferees specified two situations in which prefer-
ence is applicable, it may be inferred that preference is not applicable
in other situations such as relicensings.132
The Conference Committee's report further supports the conclusion
that the amendment contained no relicensing preference. The Com-
mittee characterized its changes to section 7 as "in the interest of
clarity"133-presumably to overcome ambiguity in the broad language
silence of Congress is too often the pursuit of a mirage."); United States v. Deluxe
Cleaners & Laundry, Inc., 511 F.2d 926, 929 (4th Cir. 1975) (impermissible to
presume legislature intended to state something other than what it plainly stated,
and to construe statute on basis of mere surmise as to legislative intent) (quoting
Vroon v. Templin, 278 F.2d 345, 348-49 (4th Cir. 1960)).
128. See Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25
FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,183, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 29, 1983).
129. H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 4 (1919) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
Rep. No. 1147].
130. Id. at 5.
131. Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25
FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,182, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 29, 1983).
132. The maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius"-the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of others-is a widely-accepted guide to statutory interpreta-
tion. 2A C. Sands, supra note 61, § 47.23, at 123; see National R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). This maxim is
applicable to the Conference Committee amendment. Cf. Andrus v. Glover Constr.
Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980) (When Congress enumerated certain exceptions to
the Buy Indian Act, additional exceptions should not be implied, absent evidence of
contrary legislative intent.); Midland Telecasting Co. v. Midessa Television Co., 617
F.2d 1141, 1145 & n.7 (5th Cir.) (Explicit exemption from antitrust laws for certain
acts is evidence Congress did not intend other exemptions.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
954 (1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1084-85 (5th Cir.) (Express
remedy for handicapped creates a basis to conclude that implied remedies are incon-
sistent with legislative purpose.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
133. H.R. Rep. No. 1147, supra note 129, at 16.
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of the administration bill. Had a relicensing preference been implicit
in the original language, the legislators likely would have clarified this
point by explicitly listing relicensings as one of the specific situations
in which municipal preference is applicable. 134
In its 1980 City of Bountiful 35 decision, the FERC acknowledged
that the Conference Committee amendment "made it appear that the
municipal preference applied only to the issuance of preliminary per-
mits and some initial licenses." 136 The commissioners went on, how-
ever, to maintain that section 7 as amended also applied to relicens-
ings1 37 because the issuance of successor licenses comes within the
phrase, "in issuing ... licenses where no preliminary permit has been
issued." 138 In overruling Bountiful, the Commission in Pacific Power
and Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency139 labeled
this interpretation "too strained.' ' 40 Indeed, the Bountiful Commis-
sion's reasoning stretches literal interpretation to the point of absurd-
ity. The question whether a preliminary permit has been issued bears
no relation to the issuance of successor licenses. Preliminary permits, if
necessary, are issued only for proposed water power developments
prior to, and in conjunction with, initial licenses.14' It is illogical,
therefore, to conclude that Congress conditioned the granting of reli-
134. Cf. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
109 (1980) ("If Congress had intended to exclude FOIA disclosures ... it could easily
have done so explicitly in this section as it did with respect to the other listed
exceptions."); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969) (Had an additional price
differential been intended in the Agriculture Marketing Agreement Act, Congress
could have simply included it with those enumerated. "It would be perverse to
assume that congressional drafters, in eliminating ambiguity from the old Act, were
careless in listing their exceptions .... " (footnote omitted)); Harold v. United
States, 634 F.2d 547, 549 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (Congress' failure to make even an implicit
reference to death benefits exception, when it could have done so explicitly, suggests
that no such exception was intended.).
135. 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344 (F.E.R.C. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Alabama
Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573
(1983), overruled, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating
Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 29, 1983).
136. Id. at 358 (emphasis in original).
137. Id.
138. 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982).
139. 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 29, 1983).
140. Id. at 61,182.
141. See Cities of Anaheim & Riverside v. FERC, 692 F.2d 773, 780 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (Mikva, J., concurring); City of Dothan v. FERC, 684 F.2d 159, 164 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25
FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052, at 61,182, appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 29, 1983); 16 U.S.C. § 798 (1982); 1982 FERC Ann. Rep. 27-28.
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censing preference on whether a preliminary permit had been issued
for the project some fifty years before.
Alternatively, the public power interests claim that, although the
amendment did not mention relicensings, preference therefor re-
mained in the bill because the Committee did not express an intent to
eliminate the relicensing preference allegedly contained in the bill as
introduced. 142 It appears, however, that the Committee did in fact
express such an intent by specifying two licensing situations, presum-
ably to the exclusion of all others. 43
3. Senate Commerce Committee Amendment
The Senate Committee on Commerce later amended the bill, 14
specifying the third situation in which municipal preference was ap-
plicable: "in issuing licenses to new licensees under section 15." 145 As a
result of this amendment, the section 7 preference provision took its
final form.
The Committee characterized most of its amendments as minor and
for purposes of clarification. 46 This position is inconsistent with the
private utilities' theory that the amendment created a limited relicens-
ing preference- applicable only when original licensees were not
competing-where no preference had existed previously. 147 That type
of change would have been substantive, and presumably described as
such by the Committee. If, however, the amendment to section 7(a)
was merely to clarify a pre-existing preference applicable to all reli-
censings-as the municipalities contend148 -it is unlikely the senators
would have chosen the language they did. The use of "new licensees"
implies that preference is to be applicable only in a limited number of
cases, not in all relicensings.
142. See City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 358 (F.E.R.C.
1980), a-i'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983).
143. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
144. S. Rep. No. 180, supra note 36, at 13. The bill was reintroduced in the 66th
Congress after failing to pass the 65th Congress because of a Senate filibuster.
Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395, 407 (1975); FPC v. Union Elec.
Co., 381 U.S. 90, 102 n.18 (1965).
145. S. Rep. No. 180, supra note 36, at 13 (emphasis omitted).
146. Id. at 1.
147. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 373 (F.E.R.C. 1980),
a-'d sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power & Light
Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,




It appears, therefore, that this final amendment to section 7 was
Congress' first expression of intent regarding successor licenses. In
enacting a provision applicable only "in issuing licenses to new li-
censees," the legislature indicated that relicensing preference would
not be applicable against original licensees. 149 This is evidenced by use
of the term "new licensees" at least 137 times in the legislative his-
tory; 150 each time it was used to refer to other than original li-
censees. '51
B. The 1968 Amendments
As early licenses approached expiration, Congress asked the FPC to
submit recommendations to clarify FPA provisions so as to ensure
"orderly and effective procedure" at expiration.5 2 The FPC submitted
a draft bill that proposed no changes to section 7(a). 53 The FPC
expressly stated that its bill "does not attempt to deal with [the reli-
censing preference] question."' 154 Nevertheless, at committee hearings
in both houses, FPC officials presented the agency's interpretation of
the relicensing issue: 1) The new license should be issued to whichever
applicant can best meet the standards of the Act; 155 2) municipal
preference is not applicable in a relicensing contest between the exist-
ing licensee and a challenger; 156 and 3) when the original licensee and
another applicant are equally matched, the new license should be
issued to the original licensee.15 7
The final bill did not amend section 7(a), but did change other parts
of section 7.158 The report of the Senate Committee on Commerce
took note of the FPC's interpretation of the relicensing question and
149. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
150. Petition, supra note 2, at 24. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
151. Petition, supra note 2, at 24.
152. 113 Cong. Rec. 26,185 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Magnuson); see H.R. Rep.
No. 1643, supra note 4, at 6 (letter of Sept. 18, 1967 from Lee C. White, Chairman,
FPC, to Rep. Staggers), reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3085-86.
153. See S. 2445, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 Cong. Rec. 26,185 (1967).
154. 1968 House Hearings, supra note 27, at 34 (statement of Richard A. Solo-
mon, General Counsel, FTC).
155. Id.; White Letter, supra note 101, reprinted in 1968 Senate Hearings, supra
note 27, at 6, and in 113 Cong. Rec. 26,186 (1967).
156. 1968 House Hearings, supra note 27, at 34 (statement of Richard A. Solo-
mon, General Counsel, FTC); 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 14 (statement
of Lee C. White, Chairman, FPC).
157. 1968 House Hearings, supra note 27, at 34 (statement of Richard A. Solo-
mon, General Counsel, FPC); White Letter, supra note 101, reprinted in 1968
Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 6, and in 113 Cong. Rec. 26,186 (1967).
158. Specifically, subsection (c) was added to § 7, amending procedures for fed-




expressed approval thereof. 159 A minority of the Committee, however,
thought the report should remain silent on the issue because the
meaning of section 7(a) was unclear and had never been formally
interpreted by an administrative or judicial body. 16 0 Additionally, this
substantive question was beyond the scope of a bill designed merely to
clarify procedure. 161 The Report of the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce did not address the issue of municipal
preference. 16
2
When Congress is made aware of the administrative interpretation
of a provision and affirmatively indicates an intent not to change that
meaning, the doctrine of reenactment may preclude subsequent
changes in administrative interpretation. 163 Committees of both
houses were informed of the FPC's view that municipal preference is
not applicable against original licensees. It is argued that by choosing
not to amend section 7(a), Congress thereby approved of the Commis-
sion's interpretation and, in effect, reenacted section 7 consistent
therewith. 16
4
159. See S. Rep. No. 1338, supra note 101, at 3. The Committee noted that it
heard "considerable testimony" on the relicensing preference issue and that it was
"impressed" by the FPC's interpretation of § 7(a). Id.
160. Id. at 15.
161. Id.; see City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 377 (F.E.R.C.
1980), aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (1lth Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983).
162. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 363 (F.E.R.C. 1980),
aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F. 2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power & Light
Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983); see H.R. Rep. No. 1643,
supra note 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3081-94. The House
Report did, however, contain a letter from the FPC explaining the agency's interpre-
tation of the relicensing preference question. See id. at 8 (letter of Aug. 28, 1967 from
Lee C. White, Chairman, FPC, to John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House),
reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3088.
163. United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 134 (1978); Association of
Am. Railroads v. ICC, 564 F.2d 486, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Chemehuevi Tribe of
Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395, 410 (1975) (Court deferred to FPC's interpretation of
FPA because Congress had reenacted FPA without indicating dissatisfaction with
agency's interpretation); Kay v. FCC, 443 F.2d 638, 646-47 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Con-
gress' awareness of FCC interpretation is almost conclusive evidence of legislative
approval); 2A C. Sands, supra note 61, § 49.09, at 256-57 (When Congress reenacts a
statute, aware of an administrative interpretation, that interpretation is presump-
tively correct.).
164. City of Bountiful, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 344, 366 (F.E.R.C. 1980),
aff'd sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power & Light
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It is not clear, however, that the 1968 amendment of the FPA
constituted such a reenactment. Although Committee members were
apprised of, and some indicated approval of,16 5 the FPC interpreta-
tion, there is no evidence of a general awareness by Congress as a
whole. The Supreme Court has been hesitant to presume general
congressional awareness based on only a few isolated statements in
committee reports.16 6 On the other hand, "Congress is presumed to be
aware of an administrative . .. interpretation of a statute and to
adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without
change.' 6 7 In this instance, however, the legislators focused on ques-
tions of procedure and not on the controversial substantive issue of
municipal relicensing preference. 166 The conclusion, therefore, that
section 7(a) was reenacted consistent with the FPC's interpretation
may not be warranted. Nevertheless, the expression of some congres-
sional approval and the absence of any expressed objection lends
further support to the conclusion that section 7(a) is not applicable to
relicensings involving original licensees.'
The legislative history as a whole, although not conclusive,r1 ° sup-
ports the private utilities' contention that Congress intended relicens-
ing preference to be limited to those tie-breaking situations not involv-
ing the original licensee. The public power interests' position that a
broad relicensing preference remained in the bill throughout its con-
sideration can withstand neither the limiting language of the statute
nor the legislators' repeated use of "new licensees" to refer to entities
other than original licensees. In addition, the possibility that Congress
reenacted section 7(a) in 1968 reinforces the conclusion that municipal
Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983).
165. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
166. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978); accord New York Tel. Co. v. New
York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 562 & n.17 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 192 (1978); Mitchell v. Commissioner,
300 F.2d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 1962).
167. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); Garcia v. Friesecke, 597 F.2d
284, 293 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 940 (1979); Slatin v. Stanford Research
Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1293 (4th Cir. 1979); see Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., 459
F. Supp. 733, 738 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
168. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
169. Additionally, in a congressional hearing the following year, the FPC reiter-
ated its interpretation that municipal preference is not applicable against an original
licensee. See 1969 Hearings, supra note 3, at 46 (letter of Mar. 28, 1969 from Lee C.
White, Chairman, FPC to Rep. Clarence Brown, Jr.).
170. See Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,052,
appeal docketed, No. 83-2231 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1983).
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preference was not meant to be applicable against incumbent li-
censees seeking renewal.
CONCLUSION
The language of section 7(a) limits the applicability of relicensing
preference to tie-breaking situations not involving original licensees.
The legislative history of the FPA does not support a contrary inter-
pretation. When challenging incumbent private utilities for successor
licenses, therefore, states and municipalities should prevail only if
their plans are best adapted to serve the public interest. Otherwise,
the only means by which a state or municipality could acquire an
existing hydroelectric project would be through the exercise of emi-
nent domain. This would require compensation at current market
value rather than at the cost-related amount required in relicensings.
Jeffrey S. Marcus
